Rethinking Australian multiculturalism: towards a new paradigm

Introduction

Australian multiculturalism as a social ideal is a relatively recent phenomenon, barely two decades old, and currently under critical public scrutiny. The renewed debate on immigration policy, sparked by the Fitzgerald Report (DILGEA 1988) on immigration policies has served to expose the inherent contradictions and limitations of the existing model of multiculturalism. The controversy about the nature and directions of immigration policy challenges its advocates to redefine the objectives of multiculturalism as a social ideal and refine its meaning to serve new and emergent needs in Australian society. As Max Harris (The Australian 26 August 1989) has observed, the term ‘multiculturalism still confuses people with its vagueness and portentousness’; he adds that ‘it is a horrendous word that should have faded into disuse’. Clearly, confusion and uncertainty still haunt the use of the word in public discourse particularly in matters of public policy.

For this and other reasons, it is argued that Australian multiculturalism is in a state of crisis; and furthermore, that the model of multiculturalism which has gained currency, particularly over the last decade, is in need of critical reassessment. The paper itself is in two parts. The first section of the paper places the notion of multiculturalism in a historical and socio-political context, and briefly charts its development through the short space of little over a decade and a half. In the second section it presents the case for an alternative paradigm for multiculturalism on two grounds — the need to face up to the inherent limitations and contradictions of multiculturalism; and, secondly, to be more responsive to the emerging social reality.

The paradigm shift proposed is described as one which necessitates a shift from the tenets of cultural pluralism to democratic pluralism, viewed as one which facilitates democratic participation in a pluralistic political community. The currently dominant paradigm of cultural pluralism is dominated by an image of multiculturalism — an image which is portrayed in the eyes of both the public and the policy makers as the only form of multiculturalism that is available to Australians.

The importance of these paradigms is that they serve to organise our knowledge about cultural diversity for public policy. These paradigms and their associated ‘images’ are not merely guides to the framing of public policy, but are also means of understanding the nature and form of the relationship between minority groups and the rest of society. Therefore, these images serve to define and constitute ethnic groups and the problems faced by these groups. They are the lenses by which public policymakers perceive social reality. In other words, they serve as a tool by which the problems of minority groups are structured.

A key contention of the paper is that this conventional ‘image’ of multiculturalism is conceptually flawed; and that, because it is out of touch with social reality, it fails to meet the needs of minority groups when policies are determined on this basis. The alternative ‘image’ of multiculturalism, provided by what is termed ‘democratic pluralism’, is theoretically more defensible in a liberal democratic plural society; it is, at the same time, more functionally relevant to contemporary and emerging needs.

Multiculturalism as cultural pluralism

The concept of multiculturalism in the 1970s emerged as an aspect of public policy largely in response to the demographic and social changes that have taken place in Australian society following the planned mass migration of the post-World War II period. With the need to manage, control and regulate the adjustment of these new settlers to the needs and demands of the host society, issues of migrant settlement became an important feature of public policy. In fashioning migrant settlement, Australian society moved very early from an ideology of hardline assimilationism to a form of cultural pluralism, prescribing desirable migrant-host society relationships and acceptable forms of social conduct such as the need for mutual understanding and tolerance.

Official policy relating to migrant settlement, with a sense of realism and pragmatism also characteristic of other spheres of Australian public life, was quick to recognise that assimilationist policies were dysfunctional and contrary to the best interests of the host society as a whole (see Jayasuriya 1985: 27, for details). Governments of all political persuasions moved with commendable ease towards a policy which recognised diversity and was more accepting of other races, cultures and ethnic groups. Underlying this policy shift was the expectation that migrants, or their offspring would become ‘assimilated’ or integrated. Largely because of this strong belief in eventual integration, there was a willingness on the part of mainstream society to accept and even promote in the short term, within limits, different ways of thinking and acting.

In this process, the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic groups’, especially after the Galbally Report (DILGEA 1978), became a part of the language of political discourse and governments were more prepared to incorporate aspects of cultural and ethnic differences in policy development. ‘Ethnicity’ became closely linked with a normative view of multiculturalism which guaranteed, if not promoted, the right of individuals to assert their cultural
difference and develop their sense of self-esteem and self-respect. Normative multiculturalism exalted the virtues of peaceful co-existence of diverse groups and asserted the equality of status and respect of these groups. A central feature of the associated political discourse of this social ideal was the construction of ethnicity on the basis of predominantly primordial cultural characteristics such as language; and, in turn, its employment as a mode of interpreting social reality.\(^2\)

In seeking to portray the existence of social and cultural diversity, the term ‘multiculturalism’ soon became an ideology and was used as a shorthand way of characterising the philosophy of cultural pluralism.\(^3\) In a prescriptive sense, it also came to be regarded as an organising principle fashioning diverse aspects of social life. The concept of ethnicity formed a critical element of this organisational strategy, and its usage in public policy tended to gravitate between two key dimensions. One dimension emphasising the expressive, the subjective and affective aspects of ethnic group membership, highlighting the need, actual or symbolic, for group continuity and belonging on the part of its members; and the other, the instrumental dimension of ethnicity, more situationally determined and orientated more towards the satisfaction of the material aspects of living, such as the need for economic and social security, as well as political and social power on the part of ethnic groups, individually or collectively.

A central feature of multiculturalism as an organisational strategy in policy development was the need to ensure social cohesion. From the outset it was clear that the acceptance, tolerance, and even encouragement of cultural differences among members of society was based on the assumption that the degree of pluralism permitted did not threaten national unity or the security of society. Consequently, one of the critical problems for this approach has been to demarcate with any degree of consensus the precise limits of cultural pluralism in relation to policy initiatives such as ethnic media, schools and services. Herein lies the proverbial paradox (Martin 1971; 1978), faced by all those who advocate cultural pluralism, of having invariably to straddle to some degree of social or structural pluralism, arising from the existence of ‘structures’ such as ethnic schools, churches, associations etc., all of which are essential to the maintenance of some degree of cultural pluralism. The paradox is that these ethnic ‘structures’ may compete with mainstream institutions and have the potential to threaten social cohesion and stability of society.

The contradictions inherent in the doctrine of cultural pluralism reside in these two distinct but closely related facets of cultural pluralism -the expressive/instrumental dimension of ethnicity and the cultural vs. structural distinction. It is these contradictions and paradoxes that have now surfaced in the various critiques\(^4\) of cultural pluralism emanating from the right and left of the political spectrum, and which continue to beguile us even after the edicts of 25 July 1989 announcing a National Agenda of Multiculturalism. It is increasingly clear that the fate of multiculturalism and the social policies based on its normative principles will depend on how these two facets of cultural pluralism are viewed by consumers, ethnic groups, and the dominant groups in society and, of course, by policy makers themselves.

**Strengths and limitations**

Looking at the way Australian multiculturalism has evolved, it has largely for political and pragmatic reasons embraced a ‘culturalist’ view of multiculturalism highlighting the expressive dimension of ethnicity and promoting a ‘life style’ rather than a ‘life chances’ perspective to social adaption. What we have is an ‘ethnic identity’ model of multiculturalism, anchored loosely on a liberal notion of equality of opportunity, but emphasising the need for cultural enhancement and above all an ‘equality of respect’.

The term ‘culture’ in this view is seen as being unproblematic and is narrowly interpreted in idealist terms by stressing value and attitudinal characteristics and, in particular, the importance of language as a boundary marker in defining one’s ethnicity and cultural heritage. The domain of public policy has been determined largely in terms of this definition of culture and the social construction of ‘ethnicity’. Consequently, the ‘culturalist’ social policies of multiculturalism have concentrated on the promotion of ethnic languages and cultural enrichment (see Castles 1987; Jayasuriya 1988; and Foster and Stockley 1989 for a critique of the ‘culturalist’ viewpoint.)

As a result, ‘multiculturalism’ as a social goal and slogan in public policy has become closely identified, since the days of the Galbally Report (DILGEA 1978) in the Fraser era, with policy initiatives such as the ethnic media, signified by the establishment of multicultural TV and ethnic radio, the promotion of community languages or ethnic language teaching, the establishment of ethnic schools with State aid, grants to ethnic groups and support for ethnic welfare services.\(^5\)

More than any other aspect of social policy the issue of linguistic pluralism has come to signify the extent to which Australian multiculturalism has been especially sensitive to the dilemma of having to reconcile the existence of cultural pluralism with the some measure of social or structural pluralism. This of course has been a cause of concern to conservative critics such as Blainey (1984), Chipman (1986), Cooray (1986) and others, who argue that these policies may threaten and imperil the integrity and cohesion of society by segmental divisions, thereby creating the potential for conflict and division. For this reason a great number of multicultural social policies have always been couched in the language of ‘universalism’ and ‘integration’ as opposed to a ‘particularist’ approach highlighting the needs and rights of ethnic groups per se. This is markedly evident in the rhetoric of the doctrine of multiculturalism for all Australians, exemplified in the writings of Zubrzycki (1982). This appears to be a characteristic and distinctive feature of Australian multiculturalism as this theme continues to be evident even in the Hawke government’s recent pronouncement on the principles of multiculturalism (see OMA 1989).

Paradoxically, this perspective wishes to celebrate the existence of differ-
ences while at the same time not wishing to highlight the consequences of difference itself. This dilemma signifies the fear and reluctance of the dominant groups in society to accept reality, viz. the existence of relatively permanent groups who are differentiated from others by reason of ‘racial’ and cultural differences; and thereby constituting not just ephemeral, transient social groups but well established groups, permanent, status-devalued and more correctly identified as ethnic minority groups, a term rarely used in the Australian literature on multiculturalism.

The hidden assumption of the ‘multiculturalism for all’ policy is that in time these groups, cultural and ethnic, will disappear through a process of assimilation, absorption or incorporation; and so the ‘denial of difference’ by multiculturalists is not just intriguing and baffling but most confusing and contradictory in terms of social policy development, because it fails to recognise the rights and entitlements of these groups as groups rather than as individual members of groups. It is clear that ethnicity in this perspective is a central notion constructed to serve private rather than public interests, especially the needs of the individual in the search for roots. From the early days, the ‘definers’ of policy, the ‘policy makers’, skillfully interpreted the ‘problems’ of migrants, their inequalities and disadvantaged status in a highly segmented labour market (see Lever-Tracy and Quinlan 1988; Castles et al. 1988) largely in terms of cultural dissonance and communication difficulties. This is vividly reflected in the Galbally Report (DILGEA 1978) which suggested that one of the prime causes of disadvantage and inequity was to be found in the language difficulties experienced by migrants. It is also reflected to lesser extent in the recently released policy document of the Hawke Labor government entitled *Towards a National Agenda for Multiculturalism* (OMA 1989) which, among other grants, allocates nearly half of the resources for the new policy thrust to English language teaching ($30 million of the $70 million). In short, the policies of social intervention evolved to combat these ‘migrant problems’ are characteristic of the ‘blaming the victim’ ideology.

This conventional model of multiculturalism, based on a ‘culturalist’ interpretation of the social reality, exaggerates privatised ‘life-styles’ at the expense of ‘life chances’ in the public domain. (See Bivilliant 1981, 1983; and Jayasuriya 1984, for an examination of these different perspectives in public policy). But from the point of view of new settlers, this ‘ethnic identity’ model of multiculturalism and its associated social policies proved to be eminently fruitful and attractive. New settlers sought social support, self-respect and dignity by positively identifying with their cultural heritage and were able to retain the essentials of their cultural baggage in the dominant environment of an ‘anglo-fragment’ society and culture.

In what was clearly a first generation strategy, this approach to migrant settlement deserves to be acknowledged as a worthwhile and effective way of alleviating the stresses of migration and attendant sense of alienation and rejection, felt by culturally different newcomers. The success of this model of multiculturalism lay in the legitimacy it gave to the need for equality of respect. Furthermore, the ‘psychic shelter’ it provided for first generation migrants facilitated their adaptation to the pressures and demands of a new and alien social environment.

The institutional and social accommodation afforded through cultural pluralism, within a liberal political ideology, avoided potential social conflicts and disharmony arising from migrants pursuing their class interests. This was achieved mainly by carefully regulating and channelling the social and economic strivings of migrants into the private domain of their cultural needs and interests, rather than directing them to issues of equity and justice.

This general approach to public policy represents a classic example of what Rex (1970) and Rex and Tomlinson (1979) have aptly termed ‘identity politics’, as opposed to the more commonly understood view of ‘rights’ which is concerned with making claims on the state for resources and benefits for greater equity and justice. By resorting to ‘identity politics’, Australian multicultural policies have failed to address important issues such as labour market performance, gender inequalities, racism, discrimination, and full participation in the structures of society which lay more in the public than the private domain.

Admittedly, multiculturalism in its orthodox version of the Fraser era, as a form of ‘cultural pluralism’ and a seemingly effective and functional social ideal, has clearly run into troubled waters. These policies have no doubt undergone some minimal changes at the hands of Labor governments at state and federal level (cf. DILGEA 1986, the Jupp Report) and its concept of ‘equitable multiculturalism’, and the ‘social justice’ rhetoric of OMA in recent pronouncements on multiculturalism in the *National Agenda* document (OMA 1989). These changes, however, are peripheral and amount to no more than tinkering on the fringes of policy by making a nominal acknowledgment of the need for greater access and equity (the buzzwords of today’s policies), but not equity and justice (see National Population Council Report (1985) on *Access and Equity*).

In this context, a key contention of this paper is that this old model of multiculturalism, despite some minor and often cosmetic changes, still dominates public discourse, and may well have exhausted its utility not only for migrants and their offspring but for the dominant society as well. As a basis for policy development in ethnic affairs and ethnic relations, it is becoming increasingly irrelevant and non-functional and it is hardly the paradigm which is likely to be functional and effective in the next decade.

**Challenges to orthodox multiculturalism**

The present crisis of Australian multiculturalism arises basically from two main sources. One is, as suggested, the exposure to the tensions and contradictions inherent in multiculturalism as a form of cultural pluralism. The other, and perhaps more significant reason, is the inability of these policies to cope with the demands of the current and emerging social reality. As regards the latter there are two major considerations which make the current approach to ethnic relations via the existing model of multiculturalism ill suited and irrelevant as an effective strategy. This is true for migrant
settlement as well as policy development in ethnic affairs and ethnic relations.

Perhaps, the most important consideration relates to the ongoing structural re-adjustment of the Australian economy, following changes in global economic relations which have created critical problems for fiscal and monetary policy. The Australian economy, like many other similar economies in Western advanced industrialised societies, has had to engage in extensive restructuring (see Dweyer 1989 for a succinct account of these changes). As far as multiculturalist social policies are concerned, these ongoing structural readjustments of the economy have had two main consequences - one relating to the nature of immigration and the other to social demography.

A first and most notable consequence has been the need to align immigration policy more closely to future patterns of economic growth. As a result, immigration intake policies have had to give precedence to recruiting those with high and medium skill levels in order to cater to the needs of a knowledge-based economy dominated by technology. The logic of this argument has been to locate the main source countries for migrants primarily in the Asian Region. These considerations have in turn spotlighted the question of Asian immigration as an issue of public importance, particularly with the increased manifestation of racism, directed mainly against Asian refugee migrants and Aboriginal people (see Jayasuriya 1988).

What this signifies is that for the first time since the mass migration of the post-World War II period, 'racial' factors have entered into the determination of ethnicity and differentiation of ethnic groups. 'Racial' differentiation is often made on visible physical characteristics such as skin colour and eye shape, so much so that in Canada these groups are referred to as 'visible minorities'. Inevitably, this raises the delicate question of 'racial' as opposed to 'cultural' ethnic factors in inter-group relations, and opens the door to reactivating latent fears and anxieties about race and 'colour' differences, reminiscent of the days of rampant anti-Chinese feelings and blatant racism in the 1880s. It also creates the potential for inter-ethnic rivalries and conflicts which have hitherto been kept at a minimum. The cumulative effect of these factors has been to increase the vulnerability of ethnic minority groups - especially youth, women and the newly arrived - to economic misfortune, racism and adversity. Thus, the economic well being of these sub-groups and their performance in the labour market have become critical issues for public policy (see Lever-Tracy and Quinlan 1988; Collins 1988.)

Secondly, the ongoing changes in social structure and demography are also critically important for multiculturalism and related social policies because they present an entirely different social environment from the one that existed when Australian multiculturalism was first introduced. Whereas at the beginning, multiculturalism was seen as a viable and effective policy strategy in catering to the needs of first generation migrants in a manner acceptable to the dominant groups in society, this is no longer the case with new 'clients' and actors, namely second/third generations of migrant origin and non-Caucasian migrants.

Price (1988) has drawn pointed attention to the increasing incidence of inter-ethnic marriage during the second and third generations. Thus, as a result of the later generations marrying outside their communities, we have, according to Price, descriptively more of a 'mixed' cultural society than a multicultural society. Thus, people inherit many different cultures and mix the cultural elements in their own way. For this reason alone, ethnic boundaries become more fluid and permeable and 'primordial' ethnicity is likely to give way to a more 'symbolic' kind of ethnicity (see Gans 1979), a loose nostalgia for one's historic origins but no compelling sense of identification or group loyalty. These groups have different needs and aspirations and make different demands on public policy. In short, both these sets of social circumstances have forced open the tension between the private/public domain in matters of public policy promoted under the rubric of the old multiculturalism.

The much vaunted multiculturalism as an Australian success story may, as suggested earlier, have come to an end of the road, and we may be entering a period of confusion, uncertainty and drift as the old multiculturalism, even with the changes effected, proves to be non-functional, irrelevant and ineffective in the current social and political climate. The functional value of the earlier Galbally version of multiculturalism persists in the Hawke era with minor modifications (e.g., references to access and equity), and is essentially a conservative first generation strategy of accommodation and appeasement. As a policy strategy this old model of multiculturalism has little relevance to the emerging social and political realities.

Groups with new needs and different 'clients' or 'actors' such as the ethnic youth, militant women workers, and non-Caucasian settlers make quite different demands and have aspirations which cannot easily be accommodated even within the context of the modified versions of multiculturalism that are being currently promoted. It is clear that Australian multiculturalism is in danger of total rejection unless it confronts this new social reality sensibly and meaningfully with a sense of imagination and mission.

A new paradigm based on citizenship
The starting point of any rethinking must be to build on the positive achievements of cultural pluralism. What we need is not a replacement but an extension of the philosophy and principles underlying cultural pluralism, especially via the acceptance of difference, equality of respect and mutual understanding. The new and alternative model, described as 'democratic pluralism', advocates a shift away from the expressive towards the instrumental dimension of ethnicity which is viewed more in situational than aspirational or primordial terms. It serves the public (life chances) rather than the private (life styles) interests of settlers, old and new alike, and offers a blueprint for ethnic relations and ethnic affairs policy. This reconceptualising is strengthened by invoking the concept of minority status to define the nature and character of ethnic groups as interest groups.
The social and political rationale for this new paradigm of multiculturalism is based first on the conceptualisation of ethnic groups as minority groups in a pluralistic society; and secondly, on the idea of citizenship as manifest in the liberal democracies of Western industrial societies. In contemporary social theory, these have evolved mainly from the influential writings of T.H. Marshall (1964), and further elaborated by theorists such as Pinker (1979), Parker (1975), Turner (1986), Esping-Anderson (1987) and Plant (1988).

By focusing on 'minority groups' and not non-English speaking background (NESB)28, we are able to correct a major shortcoming of the old multiculturalism – namely, the neglect of the instrumental dimension of ethnicity which, as I have argued elsewhere (see Jayasuriya 1987), lies more directly in the public domain and relates to questions of equality and justice, not just access and equity.

The importance of conceptualising ethnic groups as minority groups (see Amersfoort 1982; Dworkin et al 1982; Callan 1989) i.e., as 'groups which are singled out for differential and perjorative treatment by the majority on the grounds of their 'ethnicity' based on their physical or cultural attributes lies in the tendency for them to be stigmatised, oppressed and discriminated in varying degrees as regards their fundamental rights. As status-devalued groups, ethnic groups are 'interest groups' cutting across ethnic affiliations, operating in the public domain and endeavouring to cater to the needs of those who feel disadvantaged and relegated to a subordinate position in society.

The conventional 'multiculturalism for all' version of cultural pluralism, by persistently rejecting the reality of group differentiation wishes to ignore or deny the 'minority status' of ethnic groups on the grounds that to do so would be to marginalise these groups and devalue them. As these groups are relatively permanent collectivities, already marginalised, trivialised and subject to considerable disadvantage, this is a totally unrealistic and untenable point of view. The single most characteristic feature of the minority status of ethnic groups is their powerlessness in society, reflected in their poor representation in the political system and other structures of society. Orthodox versions of multiculturalism, by their refusal to recognise the status of these groups, pay little heed to the inequalities, racism and power differentials experienced by and between them.

Central to the argument of those who wish to deny that ethnic minorities as minority groups have special claims on the State on the grounds of equity and justice, is the denial of migrant and ethnic inequality, and its characterisation by Birell and Seitz (1986) and others as the 'myth of equality'.11 Thus, the readiness in some quarters, especially the conservative New Right, to endorse the 'successful' adaptation of second generation Australians of ethnic origin by virtue of the evidence of their social mobility relative to their parents, is, among other things, intended to show that these individuals are not 'ethnics' but 'Australians' whose needs can be catered for without recourse to differential treatment or affirmative action, relying instead on procedural equality provisions and minor adjustments (e.g., culturally appropriate services) in service delivery.

While not denying that social mobility exists in a relatively open democratic society like Australia, there is clear evidence that ethnic inequalities continue to persist (see Castles 1987), and that these groups suffer discrimination and disadvantages. To cite one notable example, some very recent work provides incontrovertible evidence that 'Australian immigrant labour market outcomes [have] become more adverse, relative to like natives, as schooling increases' (Beggs and Chapman 1988). In brief, the changes that have taken place have been mainly with respect to the contours of the 'map' of social inequalities. As Jencks (1972) so perceptively remarked in his classic American study, mobility is not equality.

By invoking the concept of citizenship to underpin 'democratic pluralism', we are able to provide a stronger philosophical and ideological basis for this alternative paradigm. The concept of citizenship enables us to focus attention on the social and political participation of all citizens without denying the rights of groups with special needs. Looking at the way the notion of citizenship has evolved in societies like Australia, we note that one of its distinctive features has been its readiness to grant constitutional, political and civil rights to all new settlers as 'permanent residents' without imposing the formal requirements of citizenship. However, the recent decision at the federal government level and in some states to restrict the right to public service employment to 'citizens' represents a significant change in established practices, and heralds a significant change in thinking about migration and citizenship.

This trend has been given added credence by the recent FitzGerald Report on Immigration (DILGEA 1988) which has advocated the restriction of certain 'rights' such as public benefits, services and privileges to those who are 'Australian citizens'. This exercise in nation building, added almost as a postscript to the Report's recommendations, represents more a populist concession to the growing sense of Australian nationalism, rather than the application of a well formulated concept to give sense and meaning to a philosophy of settlement. Whatever the merits of this formulation, its fundamental weakness is that the notion of citizenship has been too narrowly and superficially conceived. The emphasis in the FitzGerald Report is placed on the 'duties' of citizenship, the obligations cast on migrants in social functioning, rather than the 'rights' which accrue with citizenship in a democratic society.

The assumption that citizens have duties to perform by virtue of their citizenship is morally defensible only if we concede that duties are a corollary of rights. We therefore need a prior understanding of the nature of these rights to clarify citizenship duties. Regrettably, it is the latter which seems to dominate the thinking of the Hawke government's National Agenda which is lukewarm in enunciating and spelling out the policy implications of the concept of 'minority rights'. Hopefully, this will become clearer by contrasting Australian with Canadian multiculturalism, a comparison which, incidentally, is unpalatable to some academic critics of multiculturalism (Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August 1989).
In Australia, the defence of *citizen rights* (e.g., right to vote; freedom of expression and association; freedom from discrimination etc.) has been, by and large, left to the common law and the political and social institutions created by, and accountable to, a democratic parliamentary system. A consequence of this tradition is the rigid adherence to the doctrine of individualism and universalism, which is the view that common and similar human needs require common and similar treatment. Hence, Australian political and social institutions have exhibited a characteristic reluctance as in Britain (see Jenkins and Solomos 1987) to concede ‘groups rights’ to ethnic groups or any other minority group; and a general unwillingness to recognise the need for differential treatment in order to cater to the special needs of various groups of citizens. The only notable recent exceptions are affirmative action legislation for women and the Commonwealth Government’s Report on Ethnic Aged entitled Strategies for Change (Department of Community Services 1986) which clearly accepted the principle of ‘equal but different’.

Thus, while ethnic minority groups enjoy rights of political citizenship, there is little or no attempt to ensure guarantees of equality for these groups. In this context, it is instructive to consider the Canadian situation where defined groups such as women, youth, disabled and ethnic minorities were identified in the 1982 Charter of Freedom and Rights which made statutory provision for the guarantee of equality before the law with a guarantee of equality under the law and the equal protection clause with an equal benefits clause [reflecting] the change in emphasis from ideas of procedural equality to substantive equality, and from equality of opportunity defined in terms of legal status to equality defined in terms of outcomes of results (Williams 1988: 108.)

The proposed alternative model of multiculturalism, described here as democratic pluralism, posits what is essentially a Rights model of multiculturalism which attaches greater importance to accommodating the material and social needs of ethnic groups and members of these groups. This emphasises that the inequalities of access to resources and power lie more in the public rather than the private domain especially in the institutional structures. It is for this reason that we need to invoke the concept of ‘citizenship’ not in its strictly legal meaning as providing for negative rights (e.g., protection of life, freedom etc.); nor, in a narrow sense as a set of duties and obligations. Rather, it needs to be seen more as a set of positive rights (i.e., those involving a claim on resources) leading to greater equality and justice by enabling equal access to resources as well as control of institutional structures.

Such a viewpoint needs to be anchored in Marshall’s classic three dimensional concept of citizenship, i.e. as constituting civil, political and social rights. Admittedly, the inclusion of “social rights” is problematic for several reasons, but as Ferris (1985) rightly argues a broader view of citizenship is necessary to secure the rights and freedoms of those groups who are to varying degrees excluded from full participation is social and political life [both de jure and de facto] (Ferris 1985: 83). The inclusion of ‘social rights’ as an integral part of citizenship assumes the articulation of social justice as participation for all citizens. In short, ‘social citizenship’, by providing a basis for achieving distributive justice, is critical for ensuring full democratic participation of minority groups. Indeed, as Turner (1986) notes, it is for this reason that ‘citizenship rights are not simply empty civil rights which are utilized to reinforce existing inequalities’, but premises which provide a powerful base for guaranteeing an equality of outcomes for minority groups that may be disadvantaged.

In the long term this new paradigm of multiculturalism, because it is anchored in political as well as social citizenship, is more likely to enhance the integration and effective participation of these groups in society. Furthermore, it is also likely to better serve the larger interests of society by making an effective contribution to the task of nation building. This, indeed, was the message of the New South Wales Government Report (1978) entitled Participation, which has been sadly lost on the new breed of multicultural bureaucrats.

As British social and political philosopher, Raymond Plant (1988) expresses it, citizenship embodies a concept of the common good and a sense of common identity, characteristics which inform and enrich any notion of multiculturalism firmly embedded in the concept of citizenship. The challenge facing policy makers is to use the concept of citizenship to extend and enlarge the worthwhile and defensible aspects of ‘cultural pluralism’ such as equality of respect as a form of ‘democratic pluralism’ by extending fully the membership of the political community to minority groups and ensuring their equal participation as citizens.

End Notes

1. See Jayasuriya (1985) for a brief description of these changes.
2. See for example Castle (1987) for an exposition of this approach to ethnicity; also Sainsbury (1990) for a critique of language policies arising from this perspective.
3. The Lippeman Report (Department of Labour and Immigration 1975), along with Grassby (1973) provide some early expositions of the new philosophy, later elaborated by Martin (1978).
4. For a good summary see Knoeppel (1982); Castles et al. (1985); Collins (1985).
5. See Foster and Stockley 1988 for a succinct summary of these initiatives.
6. E.g. Zubrzycki (1987) in his approach to cultural multiculturalism, invokes the American social theorist Michael Novak’s concept of the individual’s “pluralistic personality”, as being essential to “exist in a group at the time of rapid social change” (p.7) in modern industrial societies.
7. The ‘anglo fragment’ notion borrowed from Hartz (1964), applied to Australia delimits the context within which settler-indigenous and host society— newcomer relations occur, and serves to illustrate the extent to which the cultural and structural hegemony of this fragment dominates the philosophy of settlement and patterning of ethnic relations.
8. See e.g. Sestio (1982) and Jakubowicz (1981) for criticisms of this model from different perspectives.
10. This term is highly misleading and without foundation in social reality because it exaggerates a single boundary marker — language — as the basis of ethnic group differentiation.
1. The question of ethnic disadvantage in education has aroused considerable controversy and led to a bitter debate conducted within the columns of the Journal of Inter-Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, 1985 (especially Kalaristis and Cope 1985; and Boulivant 1985).

12. For an extended discussion of this approach to citizenship and its applicability to multiculturalism see Jayasuriya’s Keynote Paper on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Department of Social Work and Social Policy, University of Sydney, entitled Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Welfare, June 1990.

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